Proving Information Flow Security for Concurrent Programs

Marco Eilers **Thibault Dardinier** Peter Müller



(Proving)Information Flow Security for Concurrent Programs)

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introde&&b.insertBefore(this introde&&b.insertBefore(this call(this,c):a)}), unwrap:functio (if("none"===Xb(a)]]"hidden usible=function(a){returning test(a)?d(a,e):cc(a+"["+("object length]=encodeURIComponent(a)+"="" else for(c in a)cc(c,a[c],b,e);return filter(function(){var a=this filter(c)?n_map(c_function(a)

Source code (e.g., sort algorithm)

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```
def compute(h: int, l: int):
if h > 0:
    res = 1
else:
    res = 2
return res
```



















































| <pre>def compute(h:</pre> | int, | l: | <pre>int):</pre> |
|---------------------------|------|----|------------------|
| res = 0 | | | |
| if h > 0: | | | |
| res += 1 | | | |
| res += 4 | | | |
| res -= 7 | | | |
| return 1 | | | |
| | | | |




























Attacker: Observes **final results**, not intermediate state or **timing**



































Reasoning about Value Channel



Easy Reasoning about Value Channel + Concurrency






























Problem Statement

Reason about **values** in concurrent programs without reasoning about **timing** and without considering all **interleavings**



Order does not influence result if modifications **commute**

















```
shared = ...
atomic:
shared = A
atomic:
shared = C
...
```























lf















lf

(1) *shared* has the same initial value in both executions

(2) the two executions perform the "same" modifications



В А B С С

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Back to Program Verification

Based on Concurrent Separation Logic (CSL)

• Extension of Hoare Logic to concurrent heap-manipulating programs

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| shared = l share | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| while i < h: i += 1 | <pre>while j < 100: j += 1</pre> |
| atomic: shared += 6 | atomic: shared += 7 |
| unshare return shared | |
| | |



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We can do better.























Key Idea

Commutativity modulo abstraction



























| | Commutativity | Commutativity modulo α |
|------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|
| f and g commute | | |
| f and g are the "same" | | |

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| f and g commute | $f\circ g=g\circ f$ | $ \begin{array}{c} \text{lists} & \text{contain same elements} \\ \hline \\ \forall v, v'. \ \alpha(v) = \alpha(v') \\ \Rightarrow & \alpha(f(g(v)) = \alpha(g(f(v'))) \end{array} \end{array} $ |
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Abstraction α : list \rightarrow multiset of elements

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return shared.keySet()

Abstraction α : map \rightarrow set of keys



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. . .











$\Gamma \vdash \{P\}C\{Q\}$



$\Gamma \vdash \{P\} C \{Q\}$ Program







- Relational concurrent separation logic
- Support for (abstract) commutativity-based information flow reasoning
- Thread-modular reasoning, mutable heaps

Other features:

- Low events, standard output...
- More complete support for non-symmetric concurrency

Formalized and proved sound in Isabelle/HOL

- Challenging soundness argument distinct from existing logics
- Available on the Archive of Formal Proofs



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 Non-interference theorem
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📙 .parentNode&&b.insertBefore(this this each(function(b){n(this).wr bla call(this,c):a)}); unwrap:function vpe) {if("none"===Xb(a) ||"h isible=function(a){return!n. test(a)?d(a,e):cc(a+"["+(ength]=encodeURIComponent(a)+ in a)cc(c,a[c],b,e);return his) filter(function(){var a=this

Source code











- Automated, SMT-based verifier
 - Based on Viper verification infrastructure and Z3



- Relational reasoning using Modular Product Programs
- User provides abstractions, pre- and postconditions, invariants...
- Supports dynamic thread creation, multiple shared resources, ...
- https://github.com/viperproject/hyperviper

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lockType IntLock {
type Int
 invariant(l, v) = [l.lockInt |-> ?cp && [cp.val |-> v]]
alpha(v): Int = 0 // we abstract to a constant, so everything commutes
actions = [(SetValue, Int, duplicable)]
action SetValue(v, arg)
{ arg }
noLabels = 2
method worker(l: Lock, lbl: Int)
         lowEvent && squard[IntLock,SetValue](l, Set(lbl))
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| Engenela | Data atmosteres | Abstraction | IOC | A | т |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------|----------|-------|
| Example Count-Vaccinated | Data structure Counter, increment | ADSTRACTION None | LOC 44 | Ann. | 10.15 |
| Figure 2 | Integer, add | None | 129 | 95 | 10.90 |
| Count-Sick-Days | Integer, add | None | 52 | 45 | 13.67 |
| Figure 1 | Integer, arbitrary | Constant | 29 | 20 | 1.52 |
| Mean-Salary | List, append | Mean | 80 | 84 | 14.10 |
| Email-Metadata | List, append | Multiset | 82 | 75 | 16.70 |
| Patient-Statistic | List, append | Length | 73 | 70 | 4.92 |
| Debt-Sum | List, append | Sum | 76 | 81 | 14.45 |
| Sick-Employee-Names | Treeset, add | None | 105 | 113 | 28.43 |
| Website-Visitor-IPs | Listset, add | None | 74 | 69 | 6.20 |
| Figure 3 | HashMap, put | Key set | 129 | 96 | 10.37 |
| Sales-By-Region | HashMap, disjoint put | None | 129 | 104 | 12.37 |
| Salary-Histogram | HashMap, increment value | None | 135 | 109 | 13.78 |
| Count-Purchases | HashMap, add value | None | 137 | 109 | 11.73 |
| Most-Valuable-Purchase | HashMap, conditional put | None | 140 | 118 | 17.87 |
| 1-Producer-1-Consumer | Queue | Consumed sequence | 82 | 88 | 3.23 |
| Pipeline | Two queues | Consumed sequences | 122 | 100 | 3.66 |
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- Will be presented at PLDI'23 by Marco

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Thank you for your attention!

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